In this paper I devise a new channel by means of which the (empirically documented) positive correlation between in ‡ation and income inequality can be understood. Available empirical evidence reveals that in ‡ation increases wage dispersion. For this reason, the higher the in ‡ation rate, the higher turns out to be the bene…t, for a worker, of making additional draws from the distribution of wages, before deciding whether to accept or reject a job o¤er. Assuming that some workers have less access to information (wage o¤ers) than others, I show that the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution turns out to be an increasing function of the wage dispersion and, consequently, of the rate of in ‡ation. Two examples are provided to illustrate the mechanism.
Introduction
Several works in the economic literature link in ‡ation to income inequality from an empirical perspective. Bulir (1998) , Romer and Romer (1998) ) and Cardoso et alli (1995) are examples of this type.
Despite the fact that such distributional e¤ects are an important issue in public policy, though, the theoretical literature on the subject is surprisingly JEL: J 30, E50, E60. Keywords: In ‡ation, Inequality, Gini, Income Distribution, Search.
y Professor of Economics at the Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics (EPGE/FGV) and, in 2004, a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago. E-mail: rpcysne@uchicago.edu. 1 scarce. In particular, this literature still lacks new ideas and theoretical arguments illustrating how correlations between in ‡ation and inequaltity can be generated, in the long run, under dynamic settings in which individual consumers maximize the discounted value of their utilities.
Analyses of the link between in ‡ation and inequality usually explore, descriptively, how relationships between capitalists and workers, or between debtors and creditors, are a¤ected by in ‡ation. The usual explanation that poor consumers have less access to interest-bearing money and thereby end up paying a larger share of their income as in ‡ation tax can be included under the debtor/creditor classi…cation as well. A di¤erent argument, linking in ‡ation and income distribution thorough the sharing of the welfare costs of in ‡ation, rather than through distributional e¤ects, has been provided by Cysne, Monteiro and Maldonado (2004) .
In this paper I devise a new channel by means of which in ‡ation can provoke income inequality 1 . The main idea is that consumers with more information can bene…t relatively more, in the job-search process, from the increase of wage dispersion, than consumers with less information. Given the stylized fact that wage dispersion is an increasing function of the rate of in ‡ation 2 , the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality turns out to increase when in ‡ation increases. Two examples are o¤ered to illustrate the proposed mechanism.
The basic model used for the argument draws on Stokey and Lucas's (1989) version of McCall's (1970) job-search model. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and assumptions. Subsection 2.1 formalizes the unconstrained consumer problem, in which the number of draws is a choice variable, depending upon an idiosyncratic cost. Subsection 2.2 simpli…es the analysis by assuming a cost function that makes the …rst 1 More rigorously, this paper deals with long-run wage inequality. However, transfers and capital income usually represent only a small fraction of most households'total income. For the United States, for instance, following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), transfers and capital income account in average for only around 28% of the total income of the households surveyed. This percentage tends to be even lower in developing countries. 2 Wage dispersion is particularly high when in ‡ation reaches a certain level and leads to staggered (lagged) indexation. Under a (mandatory) …xed frequency of adjustments, the ratio of nominal wages of a certain category, just after and before the adjustment, is given by 1 + ; standing for the rate of in ‡ation. By these means, under staggered indexaton, the higher the rate of in ‡ation, the higher the ratio of existing wages. Brazil in the seventies and early eighties is an example of an economy facing such circumstances. Simonsen (1970) and Dornbusch and Simonsen (1986) are usual sources on this issue. Cardoso (1993), Cardoso et alli (1995) and Souza (2003) present more recent empirical evidence that high rates of in ‡ation increase wage dispersion. draw free for all workers, whereas other draws are free for a subgroup of workers, and prohibitively expensive for the remaining workers.
Under this constrained setting, which is going to be the one used to deliver the main result of the paper, I solve for the reservation wage and (in subsection 2.3) for the long-run average wage of each of the two groups of workers. The long-run average wage is calculated under the invariant distribution of the Markov process determined by the constrained optimization problem. Subsection 2.4 is used to show how to calculate the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution under a given level of in ‡ation and wage dispersion. The main result of the paper, as well as two examples, are delivered in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
I start by formalizing the unconstrained problem faced by the worker, when he is allowed to choose the number of o¤ers he can draw from the distribution of wages. The givens of the model are the distribution of wage o¤ers faced by the workers, the distribution of technology/cost of acquiring additional job o¤ers and the probability that a certain worker faces, each period, of losing his job.
In the measurable space [0; 1); B [0;1) ; L ; B [0;1) ; standing for the Borelians in [0; 1) and L for the Lebesgue measure in this space, consider a continuum of workers. Each worker has certain technology/cost to get draws from the exogenous distribution of wages. Other than that, workers are all equal. Such a technology leads to a cost, for worker j; j 2 [0; 1); of acquiring n draws from the distribution of wages, given by k j (n).
For 0 < D < 1; consider the second measurable space ( ; F; p) and, in this space, the measure q induced by the (real) wage function w :
In the space induced by w; [0; D]; B [0;D] ; q ; denote by F (t) the distribution function that (q a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q :
In the remaining, subindex j is only introduced when strictly necessary. The consumer is not allowed to borrow or to lend. His consumption c t is equal to his income w t in each period. The consumer maximizes:
The Unconstrained Optimization
Once the consumer chooses n, he only considers, in the beginning of the next period, the best (maximum) o¤er w among the n o¤ers. At this point, the consumer can accept or turn down the best o¤er. If he accepts, he stays employed one period for sure. At the end of this period either he is laid o¤, with probability ; of he keeps his job and wage for sure for one more period, with probability 1 : The worker is never allowed to voluntarily quit his job or to search while working. If he does not accept the o¤er or if he is laid o¤, he restarts the problem by choosing another number of o¤ers n for the next period:The job o¤ers are drawn independently from [0; D] according to the measure q: q is known by all workers.
The formal analysis of the unconstrained problem starts backwards, by assuming that the consumer has already decided about n: The decision at this point, to which I turn now, is resolving about accepting or rejecting the best o¤er at hand. The states of the problem are given by the wage o¤ers at hand, as well as by the status E (employed) and U (unemployed).
When already employed with wage w; the value function of any consumer is:
where V is the optimum present value for the consumer when he follows the whole course of choosing the optimal strategy, starting with the choice of n: If unemployed, but with a (best) wage o¤er w at hand (A for accept, R for Reject):
Solving for v(w; E) in (1) and using (2) :
Since the optimization above is carried out under a …xed value of n, and since b and are given parameters, the above equation implies that the optimum strategy is of a reservation-wage type. The reservation wage w can then be expressed as a function of V by the equalization of the two terms in the second member of (3):
Since V is the value function when n assumes its optimal value, w is not a function of n and the value function (3) can be determined by:
Make F (r;n) stand for the distribution function of the order statistics of order r; of a sample of size n; and E (n;n) for the respective expectation operator. De…ne:
The unconstrained consumer problem reads:
Note in the equation above that the optimum n is equal to plus in…nity when k(n) = 0. Indeed, since the consumer makes his decision based on the highest o¤er, the higher the number of o¤ers he gets the better, because all additional information can be simply disregarded.
The Constrained Optimization
From now on I want to incorporate into the model, in the easiest possible way, a usual real-world situation in which some consumers end up with more wage o¤ers than others, irrespective of their e¤orts to change it.
The most direct way of capturing this occurrence, without introducing unnecessary calculations that would not add to the main point of the paper, is by postulating that the cost of the …rst draw is zero for all consumers, and that the cost of any quantity of additional draws is zero for a …rst group of consumers (say, all j in [0; j)) and in…nite for the remaining consumers (all j in [ j; 1]). From the analysis of the precedent subsection, assuming this technology is equivalent to assuming that consumers in cohorts 0 to j will always end up with one job o¤er, and consumers in cohorts from j to 1 will have a number of o¤ers tending to in…nity.
From this point on, I will denominate workers in [0; j) by "group P " (P for poor) and workers in [ j; 1] by group R (R for rich).
Given the above construction, it is an easy guess that consumers in group R will be be better o¤ than consumers in group P . The formal point I want to make, though, does not concern the level of the ratio between the wages in group R and group P . It concerns the variation of this level with the rate of in ‡ation.
The constrained problem solved by the consumer under the cost function postulated above is of a simpler nature. He only has to decide whether to accept or reject the best wage o¤er at hand, given the number of draws from the distribution allowed by nature. There is no previous decision about n: The constrained value function of consumers making n draws from the distribution of wages, when a best o¤er w is at hand is:
in which case the reservation wage is given by:
where consistently with the hypothesis made above:
The reservation wage divides In order to talk about an invariant distribution of wages in this economy, it is necessary to show that the distribution of wage o¤ers has one and only one …xed point under the operator T de…ned by:
Cysne (2004) provides this demonstration for a more general model. The next step is …nding the invariant distribution ; which happens to be the …xed point of T in the space of probability measures in ([0; D],B [0;D] ). As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989, c. 10), for sets C N (of employed workers) this invariant measure is given by the solution to:
where:
Taking limits in (11a) and (10) yields, for any C N :
Since all mass of wage o¤ers in N c implies a wage equal to zero, the longrun average wage of a certain worker j (which coincides with a cross-sectional average of wages along the whole economy) is then given by:
wdq (n j ;n j )
where w(j) follows from (6) and the measure q has as distribution function F (n j ;n j ) ; with n j being given by (7).
Income Distribution
The existence of di¤erent numbers of draws from the distribution of wages among workers leads to di¤erent income patterns. To measure income inequality I use the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution. The Gini coe¢ cient (G) is a ratio between two areas. The …rst area is the one between the the curves f (j) = j and the Lorenz curve L(j); to be de…ned below. The second area is the one between the curves f (j) = j and g(j) = 0: In all cases; j runs from 0 to 1: By integrating:
m denoting the measure in the measurable space ([0; 1); B [0;1) ) determined by (7) and (12). The formula above uses the fact that the long-run average wage A is an increasing function of j:
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Consider two di¤erent economies, say, L and H, with di¤erent rates of in ‡a-tion, L and H (L for "low"and H for "High"). The only di¤erence between economy L and economy H, provoked by the rate of in ‡ation, is that the dispersion of the wage o¤ers in economy H; to be de…ned precisely below, is greater than in economy L: Other than that, the economies are the same. In each economy, a fraction j of the consumers (which I have called group P in section 2) has access to only one wage o¤er, whereas the remaining fraction, 1 j; (group R) can have as many draws from the distribution of wages as they desire. Other than that, consumers in each group, and in each economy, are the same. The exogenous distribution of wage o¤ers is given in each period, respectively, in economies L and H, by the arbitrary measures q L ; with support in [a L ; b L ] and q H ; with support in [a H ; b H ] : By assumption, due to the higher rate of in ‡ation in economy H :
where E q L w and E q H w stand for the expected value of the distribution of wages in each economy, respectively, under the measures q L and q H . The main result of the paper is given by Proposition 1 below. To simplify the calculations I work under the assumption that the parameters of the model satisfy, in both economies:
Proposition 1 Consider two economies as described above. Then, the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution in the economy with high in ‡ation is higher than the one in the economy with low in ‡ation.
Proof. Consider, …rst, group R. In each economy, following (6), making n j ! 1 in both cases, the reservation wages of workers of group R, in economies, L and H converge in measure, respectively, to w LR = b L and w HR = b H ; and the average wages (using (12)) to A LR = : Next, consider the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution, initially in economy L. Using (13) and (14), the Lorenz curve L(j) reads:
and the Gini coe¢ cient:
where
Therefore, since the j is he same for both economies L and H:
This condition is equivalent to having:
which is guaranteed by (the higher dispersion hypothesis) (15). In Proposition I used the assumption that group R can draw an in…nite number of points of the distribution given by q H ; as well as assumption (16). The two examples below show that neither of these assumptions is actually necessary. Example one drops the …rst assumption, and example 2 drops both assumptions.
It is necessary for the main result of the paper, in general, only assuming that group R has one more draw from the distribution than group P , and that wages are more disperse in the economy where in ‡ation is higher.
Example 1 Here I drop the assumption, used in Proposition 1, that the number of wage o¤ers in group R goes to in…nity. Assume that q L and q H have support in just two points each, q L in fa L ; b L g and q H in fa H ; b H g ;
Masses (by assumption, all strictly positive) in these points are denoted, respectively, by
In economy L the rate of in ‡ation is L and, in economy H, H ; with L < H : In each economy, in each period, consumers in [0; j), when unemployed, have one draw from the distribution of wages (given, respectively, by the measures q L and q H ), whereas consumers in [ j; 1] have two draws from the distribution of wages. Other than that, the economies and the respective groups are the same.
Take economy L. In this economy, workers draw wages a L and b L with masses q a and q b ; respectively. First note that if the distribution were degenerated (a L = b L ); then there would be no distinction, in economy L; between those who make one draw and those who make two draws from the distribution of wages. Indeed, in this case the marginal amount of information provided by the second draw is null. In this economy the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution would be zero, since all workers would have the same average income. It is trivial, though, that the Gini coe¢ cient in economy R; which by assumption would be characterized by a nondegenerated distribution of wage o¤ers, would be greater than the Gini of economy L. Now suppose, more interestingly, that a L 6 = b L : Still regarding only economy L; the expected values of the distribution of wages, for groups P and R; are given, respectively, by:
and
Note that E P w E R w: In a variation of assumption (16), I assume here that the parameters b and are such that:
(an equivalent hypothesis also applying to economy H). This is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the reservation wage of both groups, P and R; in each economy, to be below the lower bound a:
The reservation wages in economy L of groups P and R are given, respectively, by w LP = b 1+b E LP w and w LR = b 1+b E LR ; with w LP w LR (the reservation wage of workers in group R is higher because workers in this group can always simply disregard one of the two draws): From (12):
Using (14) and (13), the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution (still in economy L), as above, is given by (17). Also as in the demonstration of Proposition 1:
A HP From (21), dividing both the numerator and the denominator by a L :
; the relative range of the distribution of wage o¤ers in the country with low in ‡ation, and since (15) in this case implies
Example 2 Regarding Proposition 1, in this second example I drop the assumption that n tends to in…nity (here, n = 2), as well as assumption (16). Assume that q L and q H are given, respectively, by the uniform distribution in 2 ; F H(2;2) (s) = 1=16 (1=8)s+(1=16)s 2 : Using (6), and (12), after some tedious calculations, the reservation wages and the average wages, in each case, can be shown to assume the values given by Table 1 The most important point in Table 1 is that the ratio of the average wages, between economy H and economy L, is higher for the rich than for the poor. By (18), this implies that income is more concentrated in economy H than in economy L. The reason for
, as presented in the demonstration of Proposition 1, is that the rich are more able to take advantage of the (mean-preserving) increase of uncertainty than the poor.
It is also interesting to note that (as one would expect) the rich always have a higher reservation wage and a higher average wage than the poor, in both economies, L and H.
And that, for both groups, R and L, the reservation wage and the average wage in economy H is higher than in economy L. This fact shows that both groups are able to take advantage of the increase of uncertainty, because of the option-nature of the job-search mechanism (bad draws can always be discarded).
Conclusion
In this paper I formalize a link between in ‡ation and the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality, assuming that higher rates of in ‡ation lead to an increase of the dispersion of wage o¤ers. Under this setting, the higher the in ‡ation rate, the higher turns out to be the bene…t, for a worker, of making additional draws from the distribution of wages. Assuming that some workers have less access to information (wage o¤ers) than others, I show that the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution turns out to be an increasing function of the rate of in ‡ation. Two examples are provided to illustrate the mechanism.
